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Abstract
Previous research indicated a bias in memory-based decision making, with people preferring
options that they remember better. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying this
memory bias remain elusive. Here, we propose that choosing poorly remembered options is
conceptually similar to choosing options with uncertain outcomes. We predicted that the
memory bias is reduced when options have negative subjective value, analogous to the
reflection effect, according to which uncertainty aversion is stronger in gains than in losses.
In two preregistered experiments (n = 36 each), participants made memory-based decisions
between appetitive or aversive stimuli. People preferred better-remembered options in the
gain domain, but this behavioral pattern reversed in the loss domain. This effect was not
related to participants’ ambiguity or risk attitudes, as measured in a separate task. Our
results increase the understanding of memory-based decision making and connect this
emerging field to well-established research on decisions under uncertainty.
Keywords: decision-making, episodic memory, uncertainty
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Statement of Relevance
Many decisions in our everyday life, such as choosing whether to have the same lunch
meal as yesterday, are shaped by our memories. However, we are just beginning to
understand how memories and decisions interact. Based on the proposal that choosing a
poorly remembered option is conceptually similar to choosing an option with uncertain
outcomes, the present study draws an analogy between decisions from memory and
decisions under uncertainty. In line with this rationale, we find that decisions from memory
elicit a preference reversal between gains and losses that mirrors the well-known reflection
effect in decisions under uncertainty: People prefer better-remembered over
less-remembered options in the gain domain, but exhibit the opposite preference in the loss
domain. Our findings connect two hitherto separate branches of decision-making research
and have potentially broad implications for understanding the impact of aging- or
disease-related changes in memory abilities on behavior.
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Introduction1
Many of our daily choices require us to retrieve relevant information from memory,2
and the role of memory in shaping such value-based decisions is receiving growing interest3
(Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016; Weilbächer & Gluth, 2017; Wimmer & Büchel, 2016; Weber &4
Johnson, 2006; Murty, Feldmanhall, Hunter, Phelps, & Davachi, 2016; Gershman & Daw,5
2017). Episodic memory and decision making were studied separately for decades, but6
more recent studies have started to investigate how these two psychological constructs7
interact (Murty et al., 2016; Gershman & Daw, 2017; Wimmer & Büchel, 2016). In our8
previous work, we have shown that memory-based decisions can give rise to a bias in choice9
behavior (Gluth, Sommer, Rieskamp, & Büchel, 2015; Mechera-Ostrovsky & Gluth, 2018).10
More precisely, the memory bias in preferential choice states that people tend to prefer11
options they remember better to an extent that is not compatible with standard notions of12
optimality and utility maximization. To illustrate this, assume a decision between two13
hiking locations, A and B, of equal subjective value. Remembering past experiences of14
hiking location A more vividly than B will induce a preference for A over B. In fact, our15
findings suggest that even if A has somewhat lower subjective value than B, the memory16
bias still induces a preference for A.17
An open question is why people exhibit this memory bias, or stated differently, what18
the cognitive mechanisms are that drive this effect. Here, we argue that uncertainty plays a19
critical role in decisions from memory and can explain why people show a memory bias.20
We assume that choosing between a vividly remembered and a poorly remembered option21
is conceptually similar to choosing between a certain and an uncertain option. Our22
argumentation follows a recent proposal that people retrieve past instances from their23
memory when deliberating on the likely consequences of choosing an option(Shadlen &24
Shohamy, 2016; Bakkour et al., 2019). Accordingly, a more vivid memory of previous25
encounters with an option (e.g., previous hiking trips to location A) provides higher26
confidence about its subjective value. In contrast, a poorly remembered option entails27
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greater ambiguity about its potential consequences given that previous encounters of it28
cannot be remembered so well anymore (e.g., whether hiking location B might have29
included some dangerous parts). This renders the poorly remembered option an uncertain30
choice candidate. Importantly, research on decision making under risk (Tversky &31
Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and ambiguity (Kahn & Sarin, 1988;32
Viscusi & Magat, 1992) have demonstrated a reflection effect, meaning that uncertainty33
aversion is less pronounced and sometimes even reverses in the loss as compared to the gain34
domain. Thus, we derive the analogous hypothesis that the memory bias is stronger in the35
gain domain than in the loss domain. Stated differently, when choosing between two36
appetitive options, we predict people to exhibit a preference for the option they remember37
better and whose consequences are more certain to them. But when having to choose from38
aversive options, this tendency should be decreased and possibly reversed, implying that39
people go with the less-remembered and uncertain option in hope that its consequences40
might not turn out to be so bad.41
To investigate this hypothesis, we leveraged our remember-and-decide task (Gluth42
et al., 2015; Mechera-Ostrovsky & Gluth, 2018), in which participants first learn to43
associate different choice options with different locations and then make a series of44
value-based decisions between two highlighted locations (Fig. 1). Since only the locations45
but not the choice options themselves are presented, participants need to recall the options46
from their memory when making decisions. Following these decisions, participants are then47
asked to recall the option-location associations, which allows us to identify remembered48
and forgotten options (i.e., the label forgotten refers to options which could not be recalled49
correctly). Ultimately, the memory bias is quantified by the strength of preference for50
remembered over forgotten options. So far, this task has only been used with appetitive51
(food snack) items. As we aimed to investigate decisions in the gain as well as in the loss52
domain in the current study, we used appetitive and aversive images in one experiment and53
positive and negative monetary amounts in a second independent experiment. Beyond54
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testing our main hypothesis, these two experiments with their different sets of stimuli also55
allowed us to assess to what extent the memory bias (and its putative reversal in the loss56
domain) generalizes to different domains of decision making.57
In essence, we found that participants indeed preferred remembered over forgotten58
options in the gain domain, but showed the opposite pattern in the loss domain. This59
confirms our hypothesis of an analogy between decisions from memory and decisions under60
uncertainty. Thus, concerning options of positive subjective value, people stick to better61
remembered options and avoid the risk of choosing what they do not recall well. But when62
it comes to options of negative subjective value, people take the risk of choosing the63
unknown.64
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1. Encoding (6 trials)
1 s 2 s 2 s
2. Distraction (30 s)
< 6 sFixation cross 2 s
3. Decisions (15 trials)
4. Cued Recall (6 trials)
self-paced self-paced2 s
24
 x
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how sure you are. 
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Fig. 1 . The remember-and-decide task for the Images Experiment. Participants first
encode the association of images with locations on the screen. After a distracting
working-memory task, they make binary decisions between the images from memory.
Finally, they are asked to recall each image. This procedure is repeated in 24 rounds, 12
rounds with options of positive subjective value and 12 rounds with options of negative
subjective value. The figure displays one example round. The procedure was analogous for
the Money Experiment but with positive and negative monetary values as choice options
(the analogous figure for the Money Experiment can be found in the Supplementary Online
Material [SOM]).
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Method65
We preregistered our two experiments (including hypotheses, experimental design,66
and analysis plan) on the Open Science Framework website (https://osf.io/eumj5). The67
complete project (including the processed data and data analysis files in the programming68
languages R and Python) can be found here https://osf.io/x935r/.69
Sample size rationale70
In the preregistration protocol, we proposed to perform a two-step analysis approach71
(i.e., first hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation, second frequentist t-tests on the72
mean parameter estimates; see below) and performed a power analysis to estimate the73
required sample size.74
The central hypothesis of our experiments was the difference of the memory bias in75
gains and losses. While the memory bias itself appears to be a strong effect (effect sizes76
Cohen’s d in previous studies (Gluth et al., 2015; Mechera-Ostrovsky & Gluth, 2018) were77
between 0.7 and 1.0), the effect size of the difference between gains and losses is unknown.78
Therefore, we assumed a medium effect size of d = 0.5. We used the software program79
G*Power (version 3.1.9.4) to conduct a power analysis (paired-sample t-test, one-tailed,80
effect size d = 0.5, alpha error probability = .05, power = .9), which suggested a sample81
size of n = 36 participants. Note that we selected a power of .9 for each experiment,82
because we sought to achieve a power of greater than .8 across both experiments combined83
(i.e., .92 ∼ .8).84
Participants85
Participants were recruited at the University of Basel (convenience sampling). In the86
Images Experiment a total of 53 participants started the experiment. In the Money87
Experiment a total of 47 participants started the experiment. Participants were between 1888
and 35 years old, did not suffer from mental disorders, and were allowed to participate in89
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only one of the two experiments.90
Based on our preregistered exclusion criteria, we did not analyze the data of 1791
participants from the Images Experiment for the following reasons: The participant92
aborted the study (n=2), did not perform all tasks (n=1), were not in the targeted age93
range (n=1), did not yield the minimal number of trials for the logistic regression analysis94
(see below; n=8), rated less than 30 images as positive or less than 30 images as negative95
(n=5). For the Money experiment, we did not analyze the data of 11 participants for the96
following reasons: Participant aborted the study (n=5), did not perform all tasks (n=2),97
were not in the targeted age range (n=1), did not yield the minimal number of trials for98
the logistic regression analysis (n=2), did not understand the n-back task (n=1). We thus99
included n=36 participants for the analysis of the Images Experiment (25 women, age:100
range 18-34, M = 23.94, SD = 4.45), and n=36 participants for the Money Experiment (26101
women, age: range 18-35, M = 24.42, SD = 4.32).102
Participants could only take part in the study after reading and signing the informed103
consent form, which had been approved by the ethics committee of north-west and central104
Switzerland (EKNZ). Participants were reimbursed 5 CHF for every started 15 minutes105
(resulting in 20 CHF per hour). Psychology students of the University of Basel had the106
opportunity to receive course credits instead of the monetary reimbursement. Additionally,107
in the Images Experiment participants received a bonus in the sense of looking at the108
image that they selected in a randomly selected choice trial (details provided below). In109
the Money Experiment participants could earn a monetary bonus between 0 and 9.50 CHF110
based on their decision in a randomly selected choice trial. In the additional gambles task111
that participants in both experiments performed on a separate day (details provided112
below), participants also had the opportunity to receive a monetary bonus between 0 and113
60 CHF.114
REFLECTION EFFECT IN MEMORY-BASED DECISIONS 10
Apparatus and Stimuli115
Participants were seated in front of a 24-in. computer screen (resolution 1680 x 1050116
pixel, refresh rate 60Hz). Stimulus presentation and creation of choice sets were realized117
using MATLAB Version R2016a and its toolbox Cogent 2000 (version 1.33). The screen118
resolution was set to 1280 x 1024 pixel.119
The images for the Images Experiment were selected from the OASIS database120
(Kurdi, Lozano, & Banaji, 2017). The OASIS database includes a total of 900 images. To121
reduce the amount of images for our preference rating task, we first excluded all images122
with arousal and/or valence ratings <2 and >5 (ratings were on a scale from 1 to 7, rated123
by a large sample of n=822 participants; details provided in Kurdi et al. (2017)). Thereby,124
we excluded too arousing images (e.g., mutilations) and not arousing images, to avoid that125
some images were much more memorable than others. Second, we excluded all images from126
the category "Nudes". Third, we renamed redundant categories (e.g. "Graveyard" and127
"Cemetery"). Fourth, we selected one image per category (e.g., if 5 images displayed a dog,128
one of them which was judged to be most representative was selected). This procedure129
resulted in a final set of 103 images.130
Experimental Procedures131
We conducted two independent experiments, and each participant was allowed to132
take part in only one of them. Each experiment consisted of two sessions, performed with a133
delay of one week ± three days. The two experiments differed only in the used stimulus134
material: images or money. In the first session, after participants gave their informed135
consent, they read the instructions for the remember-and-decide task (as in Gluth et al.,136
2015; Mechera-Ostrovsky and Gluth, 2018). The task consists of multiple blocks of 4137
phases each: 1) encoding of the association of six locations and the choice options (money138
or images), 2) 2-back working memory task, 3) binary choice task (in which the options139
need to be recalled from memory, as only the locations are presented), and 4) cued recall of140
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the six stimuli (Fig. 1). Participants were familiarized with the task by performing two141
training rounds. Afterwards, they conducted 24 rounds in total – 12 times with negative142
stimuli and 12 times with positive stimuli. The order (positive or negative first) was143
counterbalanced across participants. In the Images Experiment participants made one144
break between the two blocks (12 rounds). In the Money Experiment participants made a145
break after each quarter of the rounds (6 rounds).146
In the Images Experiment, participants’ subjective value of the images was assessed147
with an incentivized rating task prior to the remember-and-decide task. Participants rated148
the images on a discrete rating scale ranging from -10 to 10 in steps of 1. They were asked149
to use the entire range of the rating scale and rated every image twice. To incentivize the150
rating task, participants were informed that at the end of the experiment two images were151
drawn randomly, and that the higher-rated image was presented to them for 3 minutes.152
The 103 rated images were divided into positive and negative images, based on the mean153
rating value. For the remember-and-decide task, at least 30 positively and 30 negatively154
rated images were needed to generate enough trials. Based on previous experience (Gluth155
et al., 2015; Mechera-Ostrovsky & Gluth, 2018), the two images with the most extreme156
negative and positive ratings were excluded, because people tend to have exceptionally157
good memory for these items. In case a participant had rated less than 30 images as158
positive on average or less than 30 images as negative on average (for example when the159
participant used only the negative part of the rating scale), the participant was informed160
that it was not possible to generate enough trials and the experiment was aborted. In this161
case, the data being collected so far was not used for data analysis. In the Money162
Experiment, the positive (appetitive) stimuli were monetary values ranging from 10 to 95163
in experimental currency unit (ECU) which were translated into Swiss Francs (CHF) by164
being divided by 20 (e.g. 95 ECU = 4.75 CHF). Similarly, the negative (aversive) stimuli165
were monetary values ranging from -95 to -10 in steps of 5, resulting in 18 stimuli each.166
Participants could win up to 4.75 CHF from the gains trials and the loss trials,167
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respectively, resulting in a possible bonus of 9.5 CHF. In the gains lottery, participants168
earned the monetary amount they chose in the randomly selected choice trial, whereas in169
the losses the amount of the choice was subtracted from and initial endowment of 4.75170
CHF (e.g., if a trial was selected, where the participant choose -50 ECU, she received the171
following bonus: 4.75 - [50 ECU / 20] = 2.25).172
This first session lasted approximately 75 to 90 minutes. On average the Images173
Experiment lasted approximately 15 to 20 minutes longer than the Money Experiment,174
because of the additional rating task. At the end of session 1, participants could indicate in175
an answer box which strategy they used to memorize the stimuli.176
In the second session (approx. 30 min), participants first reported demographic177
information about their age, country, education, gender, handiness, income, current job178
and mother tongue. Afterwards, they completed two tasks. First, they performed the179
estimate-your-memory task, in which they indicated how well they remembered each180
possible item from the remember-and-decide task of session 1 (similar to181
Mechera-Ostrovsky and Gluth, 2018). Second, they performed a gambling task (see Fig. 3)182
including risky and ambiguous gambles in the gain and the loss domain. We included this183
task to test whether participants who exhibit a stronger reduction of the memory bias in184
the loss compared to the gain domain would also show a stronger reflection effect in185
decision under risk or ambiguity. We adapted a task from previous studies (Levy, Snell,186
Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010; Tymula, Rosenberg Belmaker, Ruderman, Glimcher,187
& Levy, 2013), in which participants made binary decisions between a sure gain/loss of a188
small amount of money (in our case ±5 CHF) and a risky or ambiguous gamble of a larger189
gain/loss amount. More specifically, participants could either choose ±5 CHF for sure or190
an amount between ±6 and ±30 CHF with a given probability. During a trial, participants191
first saw a fixation cross for 1s, followed by the depiction of the safe amount and the192
lottery. They had 10s to indicate their choice by pressing either the Q (left choice) or P193
(right choice) button on a keyboard. Finally, a green feedback rectangle appeared around194
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their chosen option for 1s. The gambles included six gain/loss amounts (±6 , 12, 16, 22, 26,195
30 CHF). The risky trials had five winning probability levels (0.2, 0.35, 0.5, 0.65, 0.8). In196
the ambiguous trials, the five levels of ambiguity (0.2, 0.35, 0.5, 0.65, 0.8) were indicated by197
the area of a grey bar which prevented a glimpse on the underlying probabilities. Following198
previous work (Levy et al., 2010; Tymula et al., 2013), the grey bar covered the red199
(lottery probability) and the blue (safe option probability) parts to the same extent.200
Therefore, if an ambiguous trial was played at the end of the experiment, a random201
number between the lowest winning probability and the highest (area covered by the grey202
bar) was drawn. Then an outcome was drawn based on this randomly selected probability.203
We repeated each amount twice, thus resulting in a total of 240 trials [12 unique amounts x204
(5 probability levels + 5 ambiguity levels) x 2 repetitions]. Seven participants in the205
Money Experiment did 280 trials, because an older version of the experiment was used, in206
which 40 catch trials with one option stochastically dominating the other option (e.g.,207
choice between 5 CHF for sure and 5 CHF with a probability of 80%) were included. These208
trials were excluded for analysis.209
Data exclusion210
To ensure high data quality, we specified and preregistered a number of exclusion211
criteria. The following criteria were assessed separately for positive and negative trials:212
First, to reliably assess the memory bias with a hierarchical Bayesian logistic regression213
model, we determined a minimum number of 20 trials per participant, in which one option214
has been remembered, while the other has been forgotten. Moreover, we required a215
minimum number of 5 per observed choice (i.e., remembered option chosen; forgotten216
option chosen). These numbers were based on analyzes of pilot data. Additionally, we217
adopted a hierarchical Bayesian approach with mildly informed priors that is more robust218
compared to frequentist approaches (Gordóvil-Merino, Guàrdia-Olmos, & Peró-Cebollero,219
2012; McNeish, 2016; Kruschke, 2010). Furthermore, participants who responded too fast220
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(i.e., RT <200 ms) in ≥ 30% of trials of the decision task or in ≥ 30% of the gambles task221
were excluded (however, none of the participants had to be excluded for being too fast).222
Data analysis223
Memory bias estimation. The memory bias was assessed in a similar way as in224
our previous work (Gluth et al., 2015; Mechera-Ostrovsky & Gluth, 2018), but instead of225
maximum likelihood estimation we employed hierarchical Bayesian logistic regression226
analyses. Note that the hierarchical Bayesian framework allowed us to compare the group227
posterior distributions directly and provided us with an estimate of certainty228
(Wagenmakers et al., 2018). Moreover, it is especially recommended when the number of229
observations varies across participants, which is the case for our remembered-forgotten230
trials (McNeish, 2016). The memory bias analyses are based on trials (t) with one231
remembered and one forgotten option. The probability pt to choose the remembered option232
over the forgotten option is given by233
pt =
1
1 + exp−(β0+β1∗xt) , (1)
where xt refers to the standardized subjective value of the remembered option in trial t,234
and β0 and β1 refer to intercept and slope coefficients, respectively. The probability that235
the remembered item will be chosen is estimated by drawing from a Bernoulli distribution236
with success probability pt:237
y ∼ Bern(pt), (2)
Hierarchical priors for the two regression coefficients in the model (β0 and β1) and hyper238
priors are specified as follows:239
µβ ∼ N(0, 1)
σβ ∼ HalfCauchy(5)
β ∼ N(µβ, σβ)
(3)
For each coefficient (intercept and slope) the mean µβ was drawn from a normal240
distribution, and the standard deviation σβ was drawn from a Half-Cauchy distribution.241
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We specified the prior distributions based on the developers’ recommendations of the used242
estimation package.243
The slope of the logistic function β1 specifies to what extent decisions depend on the244
value of the remembered option, the intercept β0 quantifies the overall tendency to prefer245
remembered or forgotten options, and thus the memory bias. Notably, in our previous246
work we introduced a corrected version of the memory bias which controls for the247
possibility that participants remember high-value options better than low-value options248
(Mechera-Ostrovsky & Gluth, 2018). This correction consists of subtracting the average249
value of all forgotten options from the value of the remembered option xi. In the present250
study, we also implemented this correction when quantifying the memory bias.251
The statistical test for an influence of memory on choice was based on the group252
posterior samples of the intercept parameter β0. If the 90% HDI of the distribution did not253
overlap with 0, we inferred a significant memory bias (a positive memory bias if the254
distribution lies to the right of 0, a negative memory bias if the distribution lies to the left255
of 0)1. Moreover, to test for the difference between gains and losses, we tested for an256
overlap with 0 as before for the estimated difference parameter. As a sanity check that257
participants take the value of remembered options into account when choosing between a258
remembered and a forgotten option, we also checked that the posterior distribution of the259
mean slope parameter β1 was larger than 0 in all conditions (gains and losses, Images and260
Money Experiments) by testing whether the 90% HDI (highest density interval) did not261
overlap with 0.262
1 At this point, we deviated from our preregistration protocol, in which we announced to fit the logistic
regression model and perform frequentist tests on the means of the individual posterior distributions. Such
a two-step procedure can lead to inflated results in favor of the alternative hypothesis (Boehm, Marsman,
Matzke, & Wagenmakers, 2018). Therefore, here we report the fully Bayesian tests only. For completeness
the SOM includes the (invalid) two-step approach as well as a (purely frequentist) random-effects
regression analysis [as in Gluth et al. (2015), Mechera-Ostrovsky and Gluth (2018)].
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Risk and ambiguity attitudes assessment. To assess participants’ risk and263
ambiguity parameters we used an adapted version of a previously proposed model (Levy264
et al., 2010; FeldmanHall, Glimcher, Baker, & Phelps, 2016). According to this model, the265
subjective value of an option is given by:266
SV = (p− β ∗ A2 ) ∗ v
α (4)
where p is the probability of the gain/loss amount of the lottery, A indicates the level of267
ambiguity, v is the gain/loss amount, α the individual risk attitude and β the individual268
ambiguity attitude. Note that a loss aversion parameter is not included, because the task269
does not contain mixed lotteries, and risk and ambiguity attitudes are estimated separately270
for gains and losses. The probability of choosing the lottery is given by a logit function (as271
in Equation 1) with the intercept being fixed at 0.272
Notably, we adopted a "bug fix" (Stewart, Scheibehenne, & Pachur, 2018) that ensures273
commensurability of the sensitivity parameter γ across different risk preferences. Without274
this bug fix the risk parameter α trades off with the sensitivity parameter, because the risk275
parameter determines the range of possible values (e.g., the range is much larger if α=2276
compared to α=1/2). This problem is solved by transforming the subjective value SV as277
follows:278
SV = SV 1/α for SV ≥ 0
SV = −(| SV |)1/α for SV < 0
(5)
Similar to the logistic regression described above, the model prior and hyper-priors were279
specified as follows:280
µβ ∼ N(0, 1)
σβ ∼ Inv-Gamma(3, 0.5)
β ∼ N(µβ, σβ)
(6)
Risk and Ambiguity attitudes were estimated separately for gains and losses, and for the281
two experiments (Images and Money).282
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To test our predictions that the memory bias is related to ambiguity (more so than283
risk) attitudes, we estimated a Bayesian linear regression predicting the difference of the284
memory bias between gains and losses with the following three predictors: i) the experiment285
(Images and Money), ii) the difference in risk attitudes (gains - losses), and iii) the286
ambiguity attitudes (gains - losses). The priors of the glm module were defined as follows:287
intercept and regressors ∼ Normal(mu=0, sd=1), standard deviation ∼ Half-Cauchy(10).288
As exploratory analyses, we also correlated the mean estimates for the memory bias with289
the mean estimates of the risk and ambiguity attitudes (separately for gains and losses).290
Thereto, we used an uniform prior between -1 and 1 for the correlation coefficient r. To291
calculate the Bayes Factors (BF) we compared our posterior samples to samples from the292
prior distribution. BFs indicate the evidence provided by the data in favor of an293
hypothesis. We were interested in the evidence in favor of the Null hypothesis denoted as294
BF01 . A BF of 1 indicates that both hypotheses (Null and Alternative) predict the data295
equally well(van Doorn et al., 2019).Generally, a BF ≥ 10 indicates strong evidence.296
Bayesian parameter estimation details. Bayesian models for estimating the297
memory bias were implemented using the pymc3 Python library. We sampled four chains,298
with 10000 samples each (5000 tuning samples), using the no-U-turn sampler (NUTS).299
Bayesian models estimating the risk/ambiguity attitudes were implemented using the rstan300
R library. We sampled two chains, with 5000 samples each (2000 tuning samples), using301
NUTS. Convergence was diagnosed using the Gelman–Rubin criterion (|R^ – 1| < 0.05) for302
all analyses. Effects were declared as statistically meaningful either when the 90% HDI303
excluded zero or when 90% of the posterior density was above (below) zero. In the latter304
case, we also reported the proportion of the posterior mass above (below) zero, directly305
indicating the posterior probability of the effect being larger (smaller) than zero.306
(Kruschke, 2014).Bayesian model estimation for the assessment of the memory bias, the307
Bayesian linear regressions and Bayesian correlations for the relationship of the memory308
bias and the risk/ambiguity attitudes were performed in Python v3.6.9, using the NumPy309
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v1.17.2, Pandas v0.25.1, Theano v1.0.4 and PyMC3 v3.7 libraries. All other analyses310
(frequenstist tests in the SOM, descriptives, figures and data-preprocessing, Bayesian311
risk/ambiguity attitude estimation) were performed in R v3.6.1, using additionally the312
libraries psych v1.8.12, ggplot2 v3.2.1, rstan v2.19.2 and bayestestR v0.4.0.313
Results314
The memory bias in preferential choice in gains and losses. Our central315
hypothesis was that the memory bias, that is, the tendency to prefer remembered over316
forgotten options, is more positive in the gain as compared to the loss domain. To test this317
hypothesis we performed hierarchical Bayesian logistic regression analyses for trials with318
one remembered and one forgotten option, and predicted the choice of the remembered319
option based on its value. Before testing for the memory bias, however, we checked320
whether participants were more likely to choose remembered options of higher subjective321
value. In line with this, we found that the HDI of the group-level posterior distributions of322
the logistic slope coefficient was positive and did not overlap with 0 in all conditions323
(Images Experiment, gains: M = 0.47, SD = 0.10, 90% HDI = [0.30,0.64], losses: M =324
0.33, SD = 0.09, 90% HDI:[0.17,0.47, difference gains - losses: M = 0.14, SD = 0.14, 90%325
HDI = [-0.07,0.38]; Money Experiment, gains: M = 0.88, SD = 0.13, 90% HDI =326
[0.62,1.10], losses: M = 0.76, SD = 0.15, 90% HDI = [0.53,1.01], difference gains - losses:327
M = 0.12, SD = 0.20, 90% HDI = [-0.16,0.44]).328
More importantly, to test for a more positive memory bias in gains compared to329
losses we contrasted the group-level posterior distributions of the logistic intercept330
coefficient between gains and losses. In both experiments, we found that the memory bias331
was more positive in the gain than in the loss domain, and that the overlap of the two332
posterior distributions was less than 5% (i.e., 0.47% in the Images Experiment and 4.96%333
in the Money Experiment; Images Experiment difference gains - losses: M = 0.34, SD =334
0.13, 90% HDI = [0.13,0.56]), Money Experiment difference gains - losses: M = 0.15, SD =335
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0.09, 90% HDI = [0.01,0.31], which confirmed our hypothesis (Fig. 2). In addition, we336
tested whether the memory bias was positive in the gain domain and negative in the loss337
domain (in absolute terms). Descriptively, this was the case in both experiments, but only338
in the gain condition of the Images Experiment the 90% HDI did not overlap with 0339
(Images Experiment, gains: M = 0.24, SD = 0.09, 90% HDI = [0.10,0.39], losses: M340
=-0.10, SD = 0.09, 90% HDI:[-0.25,0.06], ; Money Experiment, gains: M = 0.09, SD =341
0.07, 90% HDI = [-0.03,0.20], losses: M = -0.06, SD = 0.06, 90% HDI = [-0.16,0.03]).342
Taken together, participants in both experiments indeed preferred remembered over343
forgotten options in the gain domain but forgotten over remembered options in the loss344
domain, with the difference between gains and losses being credible.345
Testing an association of the memory bias with risk and ambiguity346
aversion. In addition to our main hypothesis, we tested whether the difference of the347
memory bias in gains vs. losses is correlated with the difference in risk or ambiguity348
aversion in gains vs. losses. We predicted to find an association with ambiguity but not349
risk, because choosing a less-remembered option whose consequences are uncertain should350
be conceptually similar to choosing a lottery option whose probabilities are not even351
known. To test this hypothesis, participants in both experiments performed an additional352
task, in which they made binary decisions between a sure gain or loss and either a risky or353
ambiguous lottery (Fig. 2a and b). We modeled their decisions to derive individual risk354
and ambiguity attitudes separately for gains and losses in a hierarchical Bayesian355
framework. Then, we linked the individual risk and ambiguity attitude parameters356
(individuals’ mean estimates) with the memory bias parameter using a combined Bayesian357
multiple linear regression analysis for both experiments. We found that neither the358
ambiguity nor the risk attitudes as measured by the gambles task were related to the359
memory bias, as the 90% HDI included 0. However, we observed an effect of experiment, as360
the size of the memory bias differed if monetary rewards are used or images (intercept: M361
= 0.34, SD = 0.07, 90% HDI = [0.23,0.47], Experiment (money as reference): M = -0.19,362
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Fig. 2 . Memory bias for gains and losses in both experiments. The upper panels refer to
the Images Experiment, the lower panels refer to the Money Experiment. The left panels
depict the probability to choose remembered over forgotten options as a function of the
remembered option’s subjective value. The right panels depict the posterior samples of the
group-level intercept coefficient of the logistic regression, that is, the memory bias
parameter. Error bars in the left panels indicate 95% CI. In the right panels, the dashed
lines indicate the 90% HDI of the posterior distribution.
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SD = 0.10, 90% HDI = [-0.36,-0.04], effect of risk: M = 0.00, SD = 0.09, 90% HDI =363
[-0.16,1.15], effect of ambiguity: M = 0.01, SD = 0.08, 90% HDI = [-0.11,0.14]). To364
quantify the evidence in favor of the Null, we also computed Bayes Factors, which suggest365
that there is strong evidence in favor of the Null for an effect of ambiguity (BF01 = 13.01)366
and strong evidence in favor of the Null for an effect of risk (BF01 = 10.86).367
As additional exploratory analyses, we correlated the gain-loss difference in the368
memory bias with the gain-loss difference in risk and ambiguity attitudes. Results indicate369
that neither the risk attitude nor the ambiguity attitude as measured by the gambles task370
were related to the memory bias (Fig. 3c and d). More specifically, we calculated the371
correlations separate per experiment (money or images), finding no credible correlation372
(rimages,risk : M = -0.05, SD = 0.17, 90% HDI = [-0.32,0.23], BF01 = 4.18; rmoney,risk : M =373
0.14, SD = 0.16, 90% HDI = [-0.13,0.41], BF01 = 4.21; rimages,ambiguity : M = -0.04, SD =374
0.17, 90% HDI = [-0.31,0.24], BF01 = 3.00; rmoney,ambiguity : M = 0.22, SD = 0.16, 90% HDI375
= [-0.04,0.48], BF01 = 1.87).376
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Fixation cross (1s) Choice (< 10 s)
+
Feedback (1 s) Fixation cross (1s) Choice (< 10 s) Feedback (1 s)
Fig. 3 . Ambiguity and risk attitudes. In an additional lottery task, participants made
binary decisions between a sure gain or loss and a risky (a) or ambiguous (b) lottery. The
colored areas indicate the probability of the upper and lower amounts of the lottery. In
case of ambiguous options, parts of the probability information are occluded. The gain-loss
difference in the memory bias was not related to the gain-loss difference in risk (c) or
ambiguity (d). Regression lines are added separately per experiment with their 95% CI.
Discussion377
In the current preregistered study, we investigated an analogy between decisions from378
memory and decisions under uncertainty. More specifically, we tested whether the memory379
bias on preferential choice underlies characteristics of the well-known reflection effect380
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahn & Sarin, 1988; Viscusi &381
Magat, 1992). If so, it should be reduced and possibly even reversed in the loss domain,382
meaning that people should prefer less-remembered over better-remembered options of383
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negative subjective value. We conducted two experiments in which participants made384
preferential choices from memory between images and money amounts. Both experiments385
were carried out within the gain and loss domain. In both experiments, we observed that386
participants preferred better-remembered options in the gain domain but less-remembered387
options in the loss domain, with the gain-loss difference being credible. These results388
confirm our hypothesis that the memory bias shares characteristics with decisions under389
uncertainty.390
By drawing a link between memory and uncertainty, our work connects two hitherto391
separate branches of decision-making research. It suggests that the uncertainty entailed in392
weak memories influence our choice behavior. Importantly, this connection offers several393
new avenues for future research. First, it will be important to further specify the nature of394
memory-induced uncertainty in more detail. Along this line, we speculate that the strength395
of memory for an option could be conceptualized as the probability weight assigned to it.396
Thus, a parametric effect of memory strength could exhibit a similar profile as the397
probability weighting function of prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and lead to398
similar effects on behavior. Among such effects are the certainty and the possibility effect,399
according to which the subjective weighting of sure (i.e., 100%) and impossible (i.e., 0%)400
events are exceptionally larger/smaller than those of almost sure (e.g., 99%) and almost401
impossible (e.g., 1%) events. If memory strength exhibits a similar weighting profile, then402
remembering an option "for sure" (i.e., in all its episodic details) and not remembering an403
option at all should have exceptionally strong influences on our decisions. Second, the link404
between memory and uncertainty could stimulate research on the impact of inter-individual405
differences in memory abilities on decision making. For example, the fact that episodic406
memory shows a considerable decline over the lifespan (Nyberg, Lövdén, Riklund,407
Lindenberger, & Bäckman, 2012) should have important implications for older adults’408
attitudes toward uncertainty, at least with respect to those decisions that rely heavily on409
memory retrieval. Third, it will be critical to test whether our notion of a410
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memory-uncertainty link can be supported by neuroscientific data. More specifically,411
neuroimaging research on decision under risk and uncertainty suggest a brain circuitry412
comprising the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex413
(dmPFC) being involved in ambiguous choices (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer,414
2005; Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, & Platt, 2006), as well as the dmPFC and the415
anterior insula (aIns) being critical to risky choices (Morriss, Gell, & van Reekum, 2019;416
Mohr, Biele, & Heekeren, 2010). The aIns is also central to the processing of aversive417
stimuli (Nitschke, Sarinopoulos, Mackiewicz, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006). Therefore, we418
assert that these areas should also be involved in memory-based decisions, possibly as a419
(negative) function of the vividness with which the chosen option is remembered.420
Contrary to our prediction, the gain-loss difference in the memory bias was not421
related to the corresponding difference in participants’ ambiguity (or risk) attitudes. We422
discuss three possible explanations for this null finding. First, it could be due to a lack of423
statistical power. This notion is partially supported by the comparatively low Bayes424
Factors in favor of the Null hypothesis (which were all below 10 when computing the425
correlations, thus never suggesting strong evidence). Second, the null result may relate to426
the finding that behavioral risk measures appear to have a low test-retest reliability (Frey,427
Pedroni, Mata, Rieskamp, & Hertwig, 2017), rendering them less suitable for studying428
inter-individual differences. Hence, it might be that an actual relationship between the429
reflection effect in memory-based decisions and the reflection effect in lottery decisions was430
concealed by the poor reliability of the later (and possibly of the former as well, since we431
have not assessed the test-retest reliability of the memory bias, yet). In this light, future432
studies may consider adding self-report measures of risk and ambiguity, as these measures433
appear to have higher reliability. Third, it is conceivable that uncertainty induced by poor434
memories of choice options and uncertainty induced by risk and ambiguity (i.e., known and435
unknown probabilities of outcomes) are only weakly related to each other. Notably,436
previous research has shown that risk attitudes are indeed highly domain-specific (Weber,437
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Blais, & Betz, 2002; Blais & Weber, 2006), and behavioral measures do not only suffer438
from low reliability but also appear to exhibit low convergent validity (Frey et al., 2017).439
Therefore, even though the finding of a reflected memory bias supports our notion that440
weak memories induce a feeling of uncertainty, this form of uncertainty may be distinct441
from the uncertainty induced by not knowing whether a potential monetary amount will be442
paid out. Along all these lines, it is interesting to note that we found positive (albeit not443
significant) correlations between the memory bias and participants’ risk and ambiguity444
attitudes in the Money Experiment but not in the Images Experiment. We speculate that445
this may reflect the similarity of choosing between monetary amounts retrieved from446
memory and of choosing between (uncertain) monetary rewards in the gambles task - a447
similarity not given in the Images Experiment. Certainly, a comprehensive understanding448
of the exact nature of memory-induced uncertainty in decision making requires more449
research efforts in the future, and possibly testing a larger sample.450
Importantly, we do not consider uncertainty to be the sole driver of the memory bias451
on preferential choice. Our previous work showed that, in the gain domain, people believe452
to remember high-value options better than low-value options, and that the strength of this453
subjective belief was associated with the strength of the memory bias (Mechera-Ostrovsky454
& Gluth, 2018). Remarkably, in the current study, we found that not only participants’455
preferences but also their beliefs were inverted in the loss domain. That is, participants456
believed to remember strongly negative items better than weakly negative items (see457
SOM). Yet, after taking these value- and domain-dependent beliefs into account, the458
gain-loss difference of the memory bias remained significant (see SOM). Thus, the influence459
of memory on decisions appears to be multifaceted and to depend on both, what we infer460
about poorly remembered choice options (belief) and how we feel about choosing such461
options (uncertainty).462
In sum, our two experiments showed that the influence of memory on preferential463
decisions generalizes to different types of choice options and exhibits a striking parallel to464
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decisions from uncertainty: In the gain domain, people prefer better-remembered items,465
but in the loss domain they tend to prefer less-remembered options. We take this finding466
as evidence for a conceptual similarity between choosing poorly remembered options and467
choosing options with uncertain outcomes, thus connecting two different branches of468
decision-making research. Further research that should include neuroimaging and469
computational modeling approaches will be required to develop a comprehensive theory of470
the interplay between memory, uncertainty and preferential choice.471
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